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Neutral Citation Number:
Reported Number: R(DLA)7/03
File Number: CDLA 5438 1999
Appellant: Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v. Moyna [2003] UKHL 44
Respondent:
Judge/Commissioner: Judge H. Levenson
Date Of Decision: 31/07/2003
Date Added: 21/01/2004
Main Category: DLA, AA: personal care
Main Subcategory: cooking test
Secondary Category:
Secondary Subcategory:
Notes: Disability living allowance - care component - inability to prepare a cooked main meal - whether inability on 1-3 days a week satisfies test - whether tribunals can properly reach different conclusions on the same facts - whether the meaning of words used in legislation was a question of law The claimant had a heart condition which prevented her from exerting herself for any length of time, but she could on most days prepare a cooked main meal for herself. Her claim for disability living allowance was refused. She appealed to a tribunal, which decided that she did not satisfy the "cooking test" in section 72(a)(ii) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act. On further appeal a Commissioner found no error of law in the tribunal's decision, holding that while not all tribunals might have reached the same conclusion, the tribunal was entitled on the evidence to reach the conclusion it did. The claimant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed the appeal. It held that the provision of a cooked main meal was required on a regular basis to ensure a reasonable quality of life. If there was a clear pattern of a person not being able to provide for himself, the test would be satisfied. The Court rejected the view that different tribunals could on the same facts properly reach different conclusions as to whether the cooking test was satisfied. Held by the House of Lords, allowing the appeal, that: 1. the cooking test was a notional test of severity of disability and the Court of Appeal was wrong to lay such emphasis on the need for a cooked main meal more or less every day to ensure a reasonable quality of life (paragraph 17); 2. the test did not function at a day to day level, but required a broad view over the period throughout which it was to be satisfied. It was an exercise of judgment rather than an arithmetical calculation of frequency (paragraphs 18-19); 3. where a tribunal had to apply a standard with a greater or lesser degree of imprecision and to take a number of factors into account, there were bound to be cases where a reviewing court could not say that the tribunal had erred in law in deciding the case either way (paragraph 20); 4. the question whether the facts fell on one side or the other of some conceptual line drawn by the law is itself a question of fact, and will raise a question of law only if the decision of the fact-finding tribunal falls outside the bounds of reason (paragraphs 25-27). Their Lordships restored the decision of the tribunal.
Decision(s) to Download: R(DLA) 7 03 final.doc R(DLA) 7 03 final.doc